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Metaphor and the Philosophical 
Implications of Embodied 
Mathematics
Bodo Winter 1*  and Jeff Yoshimi 2
1Department of English Language and Linguistics, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom, 2 Cognitive and 
Information Sciences, University of California, Merced, Merced, CA, United States
Embodied approaches to cognition see abstract thought and language as grounded in 
interactions between mind, body, and world. A particularly important challenge for 
embodied approaches to cognition is mathematics, perhaps the most abstract domain 
of human knowledge. Conceptual metaphor theory, a branch of cognitive linguistics, 
describes how abstract mathematical concepts are grounded in concrete physical 
representations. In this paper, we consider the implications of this research for the 
metaphysics and epistemology of mathematics. In the case of metaphysics, we argue 
that embodied mathematics is neutral in the sense of being compatible with all existing 
accounts of what mathematical entities really are. However, embodied mathematics may 
be able to revive an older position known as psychologism and overcome the difficulties 
it faces. In the case of epistemology, we argue that the evidence collected in the embodied 
mathematics literature is inconclusive: It does not show that abstract mathematical thinking 
is constituted by metaphor; it may simply show that abstract thinking is facilitated by 
metaphor. Our arguments suggest that closer interaction between the philosophy and 
cognitive science of mathematics could yield a more precise, empirically informed account 
of what mathematics is and how we come to have knowledge of it.
Keywords: conceptual metaphor, embodied cognition, numerical cognition, mathematical cognition, embodied 
mathematics, philosophy of mathematics, SNARC, cognitive linguistics
INTRODUCTION
Embodied approaches to cognition emphasize the role of the body, action, and sensory perception 
in mental processes. While there are important differences between what different researchers 
mean by “embodied cognition” (e.g., Wilson, 2002; Wilson and Golonka, 2013; Wilson and 
Foglia, 2015), all accept in some form or another that higher-level processes, such as language, 
are influenced by or even “structured by our constant encounter and interaction with the 
world via our bodies and brains” (Gallese and Lakoff, 2005, p. 456). Those who study embodied 
cognition also draw to various degrees on what are called “dynamical,” “extended,” “ecological,” 
“embedded,” “situated,” and “enactive” approaches to cognition (e.g., Spivey, 2007; Yoshimi, 
2012; Wilson and Foglia, 2015). This set of theories is as diverse as these names suggest, but 
one of their common features is a shared rejection of the view that human cognition is best 
characterized as an abstract symbol processor.
A particularly influential approach to embodied cognition is conceptual metaphor theory 
(Boroditsky and Ramscar, 2002; Gibbs, 2005; Landau et  al., 2010; Wilson and Foglia, 2015). 
According to this theory, metaphors are part and parcel of everyday thought and linguistic 
activity: They ground the abstract and intangible in concrete concepts accessible to the senses 
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(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Gibbs, 1994; Kövecses, 2002; Lakoff, 
2008, 2012). For example, linguistic and experimental evidence 
show that people talk and think about relatively abstract social 
constructs, such as intimacy, love, and personality traits, in 
terms of such concrete physical domains as proximity (“they 
are close”; “they grew apart”) or warmth (“he has a warm 
personality”; “that was a very cold thing to do”; IJzerman and 
Semin, 2010; Landau et  al., 2010; Fay and Maner, 2012; 
Landau, 2017).
A particularly challenging test case for conceptual metaphor 
theory is mathematics, one of the most abstract domains 
of human activity, with many concepts that at first sight 
seem to be  utterly detached from the physical realm, such 
as imaginary numbers and transfinite cardinals. An extensive 
analysis of the embodiment of such abstract mathematical 
structures is pursued by Lakoff and Núñez (2000) in their 
book Where mathematics comes from. Speakers commonly 
refer to mathematical objects, such as numbers, in metaphorical 
terms, for example, in referring to “high numbers,” “falling 
prices,” and “rising taxes” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 
p.  15–16), or when describing arithmetical operations in 
terms of such concrete actions as “sliding,” “putting,” or 
“taking away” (Staats and Batteen, 2009).
In this paper, we  consider the philosophical implications 
of embodied mathematics. Broadly speaking, we  argue that 
Lakoff and Núñez were hasty in drawing some of their 
philosophical conclusions, but that they were right to see 
important connections between their work and the philosophy 
of mathematics, and that more careful work is needed to bring 
their nascent ideas to fulfillment. We consider the metaphysics 
and epistemology of mathematics. In the case of metaphysics, 
we  argue that embodied mathematics is neutral in the sense 
of being compatible with all existing accounts of what 
mathematical entities really are. However, despite this, embodied 
mathematics may be  able to motivate new approaches to the 
metaphysics of math that resurrect and improve on an older 
position known as psychologism. In the case of epistemology, 
we  argue that the available empirical evidence collected in the 
embodied mathematics literature inconclusive: It does not show 
that abstract thinking (e.g., mathematical thinking) is grounded 
in or constituted by metaphor; it may simply show that abstract 
thinking is facilitated by metaphor. In both cases, we  see that 
more and closer interaction between philosophy and embodied 
mathematics could be  fruitful, and we  point to gaps in the 
existing body of empirical research that would help to facilitate 
such interaction.
In more detail, the plan of the paper is as follows. In 
“Empirical Evidence for Embodied Mathematic” we  review the 
large body of empirical results that supports the spatial grounding 
of numerical concepts. In “Where Mathematics Comes From” 
we  highlight exactly how Lakoff and Núñez extend this work 
by developing an account of how more abstract domains of 
mathematical knowledge can be understood in terms of metaphors. 
For example, they claim that certain features of infinitesimal 
calculus are grounded in the human perception of motion and 
that certain features of set theory are grounded in our 
understanding of and interaction with bounded containers.
In “Embodied Mathematics and the Metaphysics of 
Mathematics” we consider how embodied accounts of mathematical 
cognition relate to philosophical theories concerning the ontological 
status of mathematical objects. We  argue that accounts of 
mathematical thinking do not directly support conclusions about 
the metaphysical nature of mathematics, insofar as results about 
embodied mathematical cognition are consistent with all the 
main positions in the philosophy of mathematics, including 
Platonism and nominalism. We  show that Lakoff and Núñez’s 
own proposal for a “mind-based mathematics” corresponds to 
an updated version of an existing position called “psychologism,” 
and we  show that arguments against psychologism are not 
addressed by Lakoff and Núñez. However, we  do believe that 
there is potential to address these objections and to develop 
their mind-based mathematics into a new position in the 
metaphysics of mathematics.
In “Embodied Mathematics and the Epistemology of Abstract 
Knowledge” we explore some gaps in how embodied mathematics 
treats the epistemology of abstract knowledge. This section 
draws on existing issues that have been debated within cognitive 
science and cognitive linguistics. We reframe the debate around 
the epistemological question of whether metaphors are 
constitutive of abstract concepts (abstract concepts could not 
exist without metaphor) or whether they are merely conducive, 
playing a mostly facilitative role (abstract concepts could exist 
without metaphor but are acquired or processed more easily 
with metaphors). Thus, we  argue that while metaphor does 
play a functional role in thought processes (the conducive 
view), there is at present no conclusive evidence that these 
thought processes could not exist without metaphor (the 
constitutive view). Finally, based on our review of the empirical 
literature on embodied cognition, we urge caution when treating 
conceptual metaphor theory as a whole as being confirmed, 
when only a few small subcomponents of the theory rest on 
empirical evidence at this stage. This discussion is a call for 
empirical scientists to extend existing experimental evidence 
for embodied mathematics beyond basic number concepts to 
more abstract realms.
By pursuing work along these two lines in this paper 
(embodied mathematics in relation to the metaphysics and 
epistemology of mathematics), we  hope to point to fruitful 
new ways of studying the relationship between mathematical 
thinking, the nature of mathematics, and the nature of 
mathematical knowledge.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR EMBODIED 
MATHEMATICS
We take “embodied mathematics” to be  any framework which 
sees at least some aspects of mathematical thinking as being 
influenced by basic perceptual or sensorimotor processes. As 
there are hundreds of studies on the embodied grounding of 
mathematics, which have been extensively reviewed elsewhere 
(Hubbard et  al., 2005; Wood et  al., 2008; Fischer and Brugger, 
2011; Winter et  al., 2015), we  will only focus on a few key 
findings to give the reader a flavor for this field. We specifically 
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discuss empirical research that is most relevant to the theoretical 
questions discussed in later sections of this paper.
A key concept in numerical cognition research is the “mental 
number line,” which is supported by a well-known finding 
known as the “spatial numerical association of response codes 
(SNARC) effect.” The seminal study on this topic found that 
smaller numbers are responded to more quickly with the left 
hand, whereas relatively larger numbers are responded to more 
quickly with the right hand (Dehaene et  al., 1993). The effect 
depends on one’s normal writing direction: it is reversed in 
those who write from right-to-left, such as Palestinians (Shaki 
et  al., 2009) and Lebanese Arabic speakers (Zebian, 2005). 
The SNARC effect has been replicated more than a hundred 
times (Wood et  al., 2008). Subsequent research suggests that 
the mental number line carries over to mental arithmetic in 
the adult mind, where addition and subtraction can be thought 
of as rightward or leftward movement along the number line 
(McCrink et al., 2007; Knops et al., 2009; Marghetis et al., 2014).
A related body of evidence has explored the vertical, rather 
than the horizontal axis. For example, when response buttons 
are aligned vertically, people respond more quickly with the 
top response option to sentences such as “more runs were 
being scored this game,” whereas they are faster in responding 
to “less runs …” with the bottom response (Sell and Kaschak, 
2012). Similarly, reading sentences about relatively larger 
magnitudes facilitates subsequent detection of a visual stimulus 
at the top of a computer screen, whereas reading sentences 
about relatively smaller magnitudes facilitates subsequent 
detection of a visual stimulus at the bottom of a computer 
screen (Pecher and Boot, 2011). Woodin and Winter (2018) 
found that participants spontaneously orient magnitude terms 
such as “more” and “less” vertically, whereas they prefer horizontal 
arrangements for exact numerals such as “1,” “2,” “3,” and so on.
Another spatial-numerical association that is evident in 
both language and nonlinguistic tasks is Quantity Is Size, 
as evidenced by such English expressions as “tiny number,” 
“huger number,” “growing number,” and “shrinking number.” 
When asked to compare the numerical magnitudes of two 
numbers (say, 2 vs. 8), responses are faster if the larger 
number is presented in a physically larger font (Henik and 
Tzelgov, 1982). Similarly, judging that a group of circles 
contains more circles than another group is faster when the 
area of the circles is increased relative to the comparison 
group (Hurewitz et al., 2006). This mental connection between 
“size” and “quantity” also influences action: When people 
grasp for same-sized blocks with different numbers written 
on them, they automatically widen their grip when the written 
numbers are larger (Andres et  al., 2008).
Both size-based and vertical ways of conceptualizing quantity 
are also supported by the analysis of spontaneous gestures, 
where English speakers tend to produce pinching gestures when 
talking about “tiny numbers,” and they move their hands 
vertically  upwards or downwards to expressions such as “high 
number” and “low number” (Winter et  al., 2013). Similarly, the 
gestures of mathematicians, math teachers, and students may 
reveal that they are thinking about math in spatial terms 
(McNeill, 1992, p. 164–158; Goldin-Meadow, 2005; Núñez, 2008a,b; 
Marghetis and Núñez, 2013), and observing gestures related to 
spatial conceptualizations of numbers changes subsequent 
mathematical thought (Marghetis, 2015; Marghetis et  al., 2015).
Altogether, the current state of evidence supports the idea 
that when people think about numbers, horizontal, vertical, 
or size-based spatial representations are activated. As will 
be  discussed below, these axial representations are directly 
connected to Lakoff and Núñez’s metaphor-based approach to 
mathematical thinking. However, the notion of “embodiment” 
in mathematical cognition is much wider and goes beyond 
considerations of metaphor. For example, it has been shown 
that finger gnosia (the ability to sensually distinguish between 
fingers and mentally represent the fingers as distinct entities) 
is correlated with mathematical ability in children (Noël, 2005; 
Costa et  al., 2011; Reeve, 2011). Finger posing also primes 
numerical representations (Sixtus et  al., 2017, 2018).
Furthermore, children’s arithmetical errors often deviate by 
plus or minus five from the expected outcome, which is 
explained as being due to internal hand-based representations, 
as one hand corresponds to exactly five fingers (Domahs et al., 
2008). Body-based representations also explain the origin of 
measurement terms (Cooperrider and Gentner, 2019) and 
base-10 numeral systems (Ifrah, 1998; Comrie, 2013).
Embodiment in the wider sense also includes the incorporation 
of artifacts into mathematical thinking, such as is the case 
with the abacus, which leads proficient users to perform mental 
arithmetic using a “mental abacus” (Stigler, 1984; Frank and 
Barner, 2012; Barner et  al., 2016). Thus, overall, there is 
overwhelming empirical evidence for the idea that mathematical 
thinking interacts with a diverse set of concrete sensorimotor 
representations (axial, finger-based, artifact-based, etc.).
There are, however, gaps in this body of research. The first 
gap is that, at present, there is mixed evidence for the functional 
relevance of physical representations in mathematical thinking. 
There is a great deal of evidence for the functional relevance 
of embodiment in finger counting (Noël, 2005; Costa et  al., 
2011; Reeve, 2011), mental abacus users generally outperform 
non-abacus-users in mental arithmetic (Stigler, 1984; Frank 
and Barner, 2012), and training children in the use of a mental 
abacus improves their mathematical ability (Barner et al., 2016). 
These results clearly show that concrete representations aid 
the development of mathematical concepts. However, when it 
comes to axial spatial representations – such as evidenced by 
the SNARC effect – there is relatively little evidence for any 
relation to mathematical ability (Cipora and Nuerk, 2013; Cipora 
et  al., 2015, 2018). Moreover, professional mathematicians do 
not exhibit the otherwise widely attested SNARC effect (Cipora 
et  al., 2016). We  revisit the implications of these findings for 
metaphor-based views of mathematical thinking below.
Another shortcoming is that much of the existing empirical 
work that can be  interpreted as supporting embodied 
mathematics has focused on relatively basic aspects of 
mathematics, such as our understanding of numbers and 
arithmetic. At its most abstract, the experimental literature 
has discussed the representation of negative numbers (Fischer 
and Rottmann, 2005; Shaki and Petrusic, 2005; Marghetis 
and Youngstrom, 2014). By comparison, the conceptualization 
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of more advanced areas of mathematics (e.g., calculus, linear 
algebra, and number theory) is poorly understood. This was 
one of the major advances of Lakoff and Núñez’s book at 
the time: It specifically targets some of the more abstract 
areas of mathematics and shows how they too can be understood 
in terms of more concrete, grounded conceptualizations.
WHERE MATHEMATICS COMES FROM
Lakoff and Núñez pursue an ambitious agenda in their book: 
describing a system of conceptual mappings that show how a 
large part of mathematics might be  metaphorically grounded. 
This is a considerable extension of the empirical work on 
numerical concepts discussed in the last section. Going beyond 
the experimental literature – which is largely focused on basic 
number concepts and relatively simple mathematical processes 
such as arithmetic – Lakoff and Núñez extend their embodied 
approach to concepts associated with higher mathematics, 
including sets, hypersets, complex numbers, limits, infinitesimals, 
and transfinite numbers.
Mathematical Knowledge as a System of 
Conceptual Metaphors
Lakoff and Núñez’s account is firmly grounded in conceptual 
metaphor theory, although they also incorporate other theoretical 
resources associated with cognitive linguistics, including image 
schemas (Johnson, 1987), frames (Fillmore, 1982), blends 
(Fauconnier and Turner, 1998), and fictive motion (Matlock, 
2004). All of these theoretical constructs are associated with 
an embodied understanding of language that is characteristic 
of cognitive linguistics (Johnson and Lakoff, 2002; Evans and 
Green, 2006).
A conceptual metaphor is a mental mapping between different 
conceptual domains (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Gibbs, 1994; 
Kövecses, 2002). The mapping is usually thought to 
be  asymmetrical, with a more concrete, familiar, or accessible 
source domain mapped onto a more abstract or unfamiliar 
target domain (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Kövecses, 2002; 
Casasanto and Boroditsky, 2008; Winter et  al., 2015).
There are many different types of metaphors that have 
been posited within the body of work that characterizes 
conceptual metaphor theory. In Where mathematics comes 
from, Lakoff and Núñez (2000, p.  53) distinguish between 
“grounding metaphors” and “linking metaphors.” Grounding 
metaphors project directly from physical experiences to 
fundamental mathematical concepts. An example of this is 
the Arithmetic Is Object Collection metaphor (Ch. 3), 
where arithmetical operations such as addition and subtraction 
are understood in terms of the manipulation of physical 
objects, such as adding things to a pile or taking things 
away from a pile. On the other hand, Lakoff and Núñez’s 
linking metaphors project from various abstract parts of 
mathematics to each other, connecting, for example, classes 
to predicates, numbers to points, and line segments to arcs 
of a unit circle. Linking metaphors are, thus, one step or 
several steps further removed from embodied experience than 
grounding metaphors. The overarching idea is that all of 
mathematics can be  understood as a system of metaphorical 
mappings that are either directly grounded in experience via 
grounding metaphors or indirectly grounded via 
linking metaphors.
As is common in conceptual metaphor theory (see, e.g., 
Kövecses, 2002), Lakoff and Núñez allow multiple source 
domains to project to the same target domain. For example, 
arithmetic can be  understood both in terms of object 
collection (e.g., “Take two from five and you  have three 
left,” p.  56) and object construction (e.g., “Five is made up 
of two plus three” or “You can factor 28 into 7 times 4,” 
p.  65). Arithmetic can be  understood in other ways as well. 
The Arithmetic Is Measuring Stick metaphor involves 
thinking of arithmetic as making a hypothetical measurement 
stick longer (addition) or shorter (subtraction). Finally, the 
Arithmetic Is Motion Along A Path metaphor construes 
numbers as points on a path that is traversed from left to 
right (addition) or from right to left (subtraction). Together, 
Lakoff and Núñez (2000, p.  75) call these metaphors the 
“4 grounding metaphors” or the “4 G’s” of arithmetic. Although 
not all of the 4G’s have been experimentally confirmed, 
there  is, in fact, empirical evidence for the idea that 
people  have  multiple ways of conceptualizing arithmetical 
operations:  Marghetis (2015, Ch. 4) shows that priming 
people with movement vs. collection-based images leads them 
to gesture in terms of the Arithmetic Is Motion Along  
A Path metaphor or the Arithmetic Is Object Collection  
metaphor.
An example of a linking metaphor is a metaphor that links 
basic arithmetic with Boole’s logic of classes. This metaphor 
maps the number “one” to a class containing a single object. 
It maps the operation “7  +  5” to the union of a class with 
seven objects and a class with five objects. As Lakoff and 
Núñez (2000, p.  125) describe it, this is a linking metaphor 
and not a grounding metaphor because “it links one branch 
of mathematics (the logic of classes) to another branch of 
mathematics (arithmetic)”. One can see how the combination 
of linking and grounding metaphors leads to a view of 
mathematics where all mathematical concepts are ultimately 
grounded in concrete bodily experience (see Figure  1). In this 
particular case, one domain of the linking metaphor, arithmetic, 
is itself grounded in the four grounding metaphors of arithmetic. 
Hence, the inferential structures that characterize the 
Arithmetic Is Object Collection metaphor carry over 
to the relatively more abstract domain of classes. On top of 
that, the target domain of abstract classes itself is directly 
grounded by the metaphor Classes Are Containers, where 
classes are thought of as containers and our everyday 
understanding of interacting with containers (putting things 
in them, taking things out of them) is mapped onto thinking 
about classes. The linking metaphor, then, links two target 
domains – Classes and Arithmetic – each of which is 
separately grounded in distinct source domains.
Within Lakoff and Núñez’s enterprise, the concept of infinity 
is especially important. In part, this is because infinity plays 
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a key role in many different areas of modern mathematics, 
such as calculus. However, infinity is particularly important 
for embodied mathematics because at first sight it appears to 
challenge this position. How can something that is infinite 
be  grounded by something that is bodily and, hence, finite? 
As Lakoff and Núñez (2000, p.  155) say, “One might think 
that if any concept cannot be  embodied, it is the concept 
of infinity”.
Lakoff and Núñez dub the metaphor that grounds our 
understanding of infinity the Basic Metaphor of Infinity. 
With this metaphor, the source domain is the experience of 
a completed iterative process, for example, writing a series 
of thank you  cards, or moving all of the boxes in one room 
to another. The target domain is an iterative process that 
“goes on and on,” what Aristotle called a “potential infinity” 
(Bowin, 2007). The crucial component of the mapping is 
from the part of the source domain which involves completing 
the iterative process: sending the last thank you  card, or 
moving the last box. The final state of such a completed 
iterative process is mapped to the target domain of an infinitely 
repeating process, to yield the metaphorical concept of the 
completion of an infinitely repeating process. This is what 
Aristotle called an “actual infinity.” So the metaphor bridges 
the conceptual gap between potential and actual infinity by 
drawing on our fundamental experience with repeating processes 
that have an actual end point. The Basic Metaphor of 
Infinity has been further developed as a “double-scope 
conceptual blend” by Núñez (2005). Critical discussions of 
the Basic Metaphor of Infinity and several alternative 
accounts are reviewed in Pantsar (2015), who develops his 
own “process object” metaphor for infinity, whereby we  map 
directly from our understanding of unending processes 
(e.g., the process of calculating successive numbers in the 
Fibonacci sequence) to an understanding of objects (“the” 
Fibonacci sequence as a mathematical object).
Lakoff and Núñez ground the Basic Metaphor of Infinity 
in fundamental features of the human conceptual system. 
Ongoing vs. completed processes are related to what linguists 
call aspect (Comrie, 1976; Matlock, 2011). For example, the 
sentence “He took hush money” implies a unitary event. By 
contrast “He was taking hush money” has a different temporal 
structure: It implies a repeated or iterative process (Fausey 
and Matlock, 2011). The interplay between potential and 
actual infinity is related to a more general human tendency 
to think of processes in terms of things, and things in terms 
of processes, as evidenced, for example, by the phenomenon 
of fictive motion, where a static location, such as a road, is 
understood in a dynamic fashion, such as when saying “The 
road runs along the coast” (Matlock, 2004). The fact that 
humans can easily shift between conceptualizing events as 
repeated and ongoing or as static and completed further 
supports the Basic Metaphor of Infinity as one where 
an endlessly repeating process is understood as having a static 
end point. Besides resting on the cognitive capacity to readily 
switch between different aspectual conceptualizations of events, 
the Basic Metaphor of Infinity rests on the capacity to 
perform mappings between domains, e.g., when repeated 
processes with an end are mapped onto repeated processes 
without an end.
Lakoff and Núñez on the Philosophy of 
Mathematics
The focus of Lakoff and Núñez’s work is on mathematical 
cognition. Both their work and its subsequent development 
(Núñez, 2005; Pantsar, 2015, 2018) provide broad support 
for the idea that mathematical thinking is in many ways 
embodied. However, Lakoff and Núñez also develop an account 
of the ontology or metaphysics of mathematics. This 
metaphysical strain runs through the entire book. In the 
preface they say they will sketch a “beautiful picture… of 
what mathematics really is” (p.  18). They end by describing 
their results as “a theory of the only mathematics we  know 
or can know … a theory of what mathematics is—what it 
really is!” (p.  346). They frame many of their analyses of 
mathematical ideas as also being results about mathematics 
itself. For example, they conclude their discussion of algebraic 
metaphor systems by proclaiming: “what we  learn from this 
is not any new algebra but, rather, what algebra is” (p.  119, 
their emphasis).
According to Lakoff and Núñez, mathematical objects 
correspond to the kind of embodied conceptual structures 
reviewed above:
Mathematical objects are embodied concepts – that is, 
ideas that are ultimately grounded in human experience 
and put together via normal human conceptual 
mechanisms, such as image schemas, conceptual 
metaphors, and conceptual blends (p. 386).
Thus, for example, they say: “numbers are in people’s minds, 
not out in space” (p.  345). In their discussion of Cantor’s 
diagonalization proof, they say that the proof is “inherently 
metaphorical” and based “not in the external, objective world 
but only in minds” (p.  212).
Lakoff and Núñez contrast this view with what they call 
the “Romance of Mathematics,” a list of positions they take 
to be  typically held by mathematicians and philosophers of 
mathematics. This “Romance of Mathematics” view can 
broadly be  characterized as the position that mathematics 
has a mind-independent status, i.e., mathematics objectively 
FIGURE 1 | An example which shows how, according to Lakoff and Núñez 
(2000), different areas of mathematics are connected to each other by linking 
metaphors, and grounded in bodily experience.
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exists, even without human involvement. In contrast to this 
view, Lakoff and Núñez (2000, p. 15) deny that mathematics 
has “an objective existence … independent of and transcending 
the existence of human beings.”
It is tempting to assume that this position slips into relativism, 
the idea that mathematics can be different for different cultures 
or different people. However, Lakoff and Núñez (2000, e.g., 
p.  9 and p.  362–363) also distance themselves from what they 
dub “radical social constructivism,” or more generally postmodern 
interpretations of mathematics, which see mathematics as a 
purely subjective cognitive enterprise that is culturally relative. 
Against such radically constructivist accounts, they note that 
the core body of mathematics appears to be  relatively stable 
across histories and cultures, something that they argue has 
to do with the fact that many of our most fundamental embodied 
experiences (such as interactions with object collections) are 
shared across cultures and have not changed significantly over 
time. It is clear that there is important cultural variation in 
mathematical thinking (e.g., Stigler, 1984; Göbel et  al., 2011; 
Bender and Beller, 2012), however, most of this variation 
concerns differences in low-level representation of numbers or 
arithmetical operations which, although they may differ in 
terms of processing cost and efficiency, yield mathematically 
equivalent results. In contrast, professional mathematicians form 
an international community that uses a widely shared system 
of mathematics.
EMBODIED MATHEMATICS AND THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MATHEMATICS
We have seen that Lakoff and Núñez (2000, p.  8) present 
their work as an account of what “mathematics really is.” 
Mathematical objects are taken to be  embodied concepts in 
the mind. They present this view of mind-based mathematics 
as a new contribution to the landscape of traditional philosophy 
of mathematics, which “is not consistent with any of the existing 
philosophies of mathematics.”
In this section, we critically assess the claim that embodied 
mathematics provides a new answer to the question of what 
mathematics is. We  begin by reviewing the main positions 
in the metaphysics of mathematics (“Platonism and 
Nominalism”), organizing our review around two dominant 
positions: Platonism and nominalism. In “The Metaphysical 
Neutrality of Embodied Mathematics Research” we  argue 
that the cognitive science of mathematics is metaphysically 
neutral, in the sense of being compatible with all existing 
positions regarding the ontological status of mathematical 
entities. All of the results about embodied mathematics 
surveyed above could be endorsed by Platonists and nominalists 
in all of their varieties. In “Psychologism” we  consider the 
ontological position that comes closest to Lakoff and Núñez’s 
mind-based view: psychologism. The problems that 
psychologism faces are formidable and show just how hard 
it is to pursue ontology using any type of mind-based 
mathematics, including one that is based on embodied minds. 
However, in “Reviving Psychologism?” we  consider one way 
an embodied, neo-psychologist approach to mathematics 
might be developed by treating mathematics as the operation 
of universal cognitive structures that evolved to accurately 
represent physical regularities in the universe. Such a position 
still faces challenges, but the challenges could be surmounted, 
resulting in a plausible form of mind-based mathematics in 
the spirit of Lakoff and Núñez’s original work.
Platonism and Nominalism
Within the broad landscape of philosophy of mathematics, 
Lakoff and Nuñez focus on the ontology or metaphysics of 
mathematics. What kinds of things are numbers or differential 
equations or sets? What is the ontological status of the 
objects referred to in mathematical and logical discourse? 
We  will not canvas all extant position in the metaphysics 
of mathematics but will instead focus largely (but not 
exclusively) on the two most prominent positions: Platonism 
and nominalism.1
Platonism is the view that mathematical objects, such as 
numbers and sets, exist as abstract objects or abstracta, that 
is, as non-spatio-temporal objects. In the cartoon version of 
this view, mathematical objects exist in a “Platonic heaven” 
of abstract entities, a so-called “third realm” distinct from the 
subjective and physical realms. In more contemporary 
“structuralist” versions of Platonism, mathematical objects are 
taken to be  structures or patterns instantiated by physical 
objects [structuralism in this sense is sometimes called ante 
rem structuralism and is contrasted with others forms of 
structuralism, some of which are nominalist (Shapiro, 1996)].
A standard way to support Platonism is via an “indispensability 
argument” (Putnam, 1975; Quine, 1980). Here is a standard 
reconstruction due to Colyvan (2012):
(P1) We  ought to have ontological commitment to all and 
only the entities that are indispensable to our current best 
scientific theories.
(P2) Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best 
scientific theories.
(C) We  ought to have ontological commitment to 
mathematical entities.
There are several classic problems with Platonism (Balaguer, 
2009; Colyvan, 2012, section 3.3; Linnebo, 2018, “Embodied 
Mathematics and the Metaphysics of Mathematics” section). 
Perhaps the most prominent is that positing the existence of 
abstract, non-spatio-temporal entities conflicts with our standard 
physicalist picture of the world. A more specific form of this 
objection is epistemological (Benacerraf, 1973). According to 
1 Contemporary philosophers are evenly divided between these positions (Bourget 
and Chalmers, 2014). In a 2009 survey of 931 professional philosophers, 39.3% 
said they “accept or lean towards Platonism,” while 37.7% said they “accept 
or lean towards nominalism.” The rest (23%) described their position as “other.” 
However, given that this was a general survey of philosophers, this may overstate 
the case for “other.” Mark Balaguer reports that “among philosophers of math, 
I  would be  stunned if the number were anywhere near that high. Just about 
everyone in that field is either a Platonist or a nominalist” (personal 
communication).
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a standard view of knowledge, when an agent has knowledge 
of an object, this is in part because the object causes them 
to have that knowledge by stimulating their sensory apparatus. 
But abstract entities cannot be  causally connected to our 
sensory apparatus.
Platonism is the most prevalent form of realism about 
mathematical objects: it holds that mathematical objects exist 
as non-spatio-temporal, abstract objects. Other kinds of realists 
hold that mathematical objects exist as mental entities 
(psychologism) or physical entities (physicalism).2 These other 
forms of realism face serious problems and in light of this 
are minority positions in the current philosophical landscape. 
However, as we  will see, Lakoff and Núñez may show how 
embodied mathematics could be  used to successfully revive a 
position that merges psychologism with certain elements 
of physicalism.
Nominalism is the view that mathematical objects exist “in 
name only.” We have words for mathematical objects, but those 
words do not imply the existence of mathematical objects that 
exist outside of space and time. Nominalism is a popular 
position because it is consistent with the standard ontology 
of contemporary science, according to which the world is 
populated by physical entities, and nothing else. Nominalism 
is a form of anti-realism, which denies that mathematical 
statements refer to real things. Anti-realism and nominalism 
come in many forms (Bueno, 2013). For example, game formalism 
is the view that mathematics is a system of rules which involves 
deriving consequences from axioms in a formal system. Setting 
up a system of axioms is like setting up the rules of a game. 
There are “moves” that are consistent with those rules and 
moves that are not. Describing such a system of legal and 
illegal moves does not commit us to the existence of abstract 
mathematical objects. The mathematics of group theory does 
not commit us to the existence of abstract groups any more 
than chess commits us the existence of abstract chess positions.
Another, more popular form of nominalism in the 
contemporary literature is fictionalism (Balaguer, 2009), which 
sees existential mathematical statements as important falsehoods. 
The advantage of fictionalism is that it accepts both premises 
of the indispensability argument, which suggest that our best 
scientific theories imply the existence of mathematical objects, 
but then denies that those objects exist, so that our best theories 
are false. Of course, the idea that mathematical statements are 
false is jarring at first, but its adherents downplay the concern. 
Mathematical discourse would be true if abstract objects existed, 
and that “virtual truth” is enough to preserve all the valuable 
functions mathematics serves: “it’s this virtual truth, or for-all-
practical-purposes truth, that’s really important. Literal truth, 
on this view, just is not very important; it is not to be  valued; 
and so it just does not matter if our mathematical and scientific 
theories aren’t literally true” (Balaguer, 2014, p.  8).
Further discussion of game formalism, fictionalism, and 
other forms of nominalism are developed in (Colyvan and 
Zalta, 1999; Balaguer, 2009, 2018; Bueno, 2013; Weir, 2020).
2 A discussion of both positions and their historical and contemporary proponents 
is Balaguer (2009).
The Metaphysical Neutrality of Embodied 
Mathematics Research
Embodied mathematics, including the entire body of results 
discussed in Lakoff and Nuñez’s Where mathematics comes 
from, as well as its elaboration in the more recent literature, 
is consistent with Platonism, nominalism, and indeed every 
account of the metaphysics of mathematics that we  are 
aware of. It is in this sense metaphysically neutral. This 
neutrality with respect to metaphysics does not entail that 
embodied mathematics is neutral with respect to other 
areas of inquiry in the philosophy of mathematics, such 
as epistemology.
One generic way to see this is to note that many 
contemporary philosophers of mathematics are naturalists 
who accept that the natural sciences – including the cognitive 
sciences – are our best sources of knowledge about the 
physical universe and the laws which govern it. Naturalist 
considerations are a main factor guiding nominalism, 
which  denies the existence of abstract objects altogether. 
Contemporary Platonism is largely motivated by the 
indispensability argument, which bases the existence of 
mathematical objects on the fact that they are referred to 
by our best scientific theories. Insofar as they are naturalists, 
contemporary nominalists and Platonists would both accept 
the claims about mathematical thinking surveyed in “Empirical 
Evidence for Embodied Mathematic” insofar as they are 
supported by empirical evidence.
To further see how Platonism and nominalism are consistent 
with embodied mathematics, consider how empirical results 
in this field of study would actually look to proponents of 
these views. For example, consider the evidence that our fingers 
make it relatively easy to grasp the abstract truths of basic 
arithmetic, while transfinite cardinals are more difficult to 
grasp as they have no immediate correspondence with the 
physical world. Thus, we are prone to make errors like assuming 
that infinity is less than infinity  plus one (Pantsar, 2015). So 
embodied mathematics shows us when it is easier or harder 
to grasp abstract objects, and which cognitive structures and 
processes facilitate or hinder the development and comprehension 
of new mathematical concepts. A Platonist could accept all 
of these results as empirically established facts about when it 
is easier or harder to “grasp” abstract mathematical entities, 
e.g., (for an ante rem structuralist) the structural patterns 
instantiated by physical objects. In a similar way, a game 
formalist would accept that our fingers make it easier to learn 
the rules of the game of basic arithmetic and that it is 
correspondingly harder to learn the rules of the game of 
transfinite arithmetic. Similar considerations show that other 
forms of Platonism and nominalism could also accept the 
results of embodied mathematics. In each case, the question 
of how we  come to understand mathematical entities is 
orthogonal to the question of what those entities are or indeed 
whether they exist or not.
Thus, Lakoff and Núñez (2000, p.  9) are wrong to claim 
that their account “is not consistent with any of the existing 
philosophies of mathematics.” No philosophers of mathematics, 
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on the basis of their metaphysical theories, have reason to 
deny that mathematical cognition is influenced by 
human embodiment.
Psychologism
Psychologism is the view that the existential statements of 
logic and mathematics refer to psychological or cognitive 
processes. Psychologism emerged in England and Germany in 
the 19th century and is probably best known as a position 
Frege and Husserl argued vigorously against (Frege, 1884; 
Husserl, 2012), and by the early 20th century, it was effectively 
defeated as a philosophical position. It is now often remembered 
as a kind of mistake. As Kusch notes in a recent review: 
“many authors use the term ‘psychologism’ for what they 
perceive as the mistake of identifying non-psychological with 
psychological entities” (Kusch, 2020).
The simplest and least plausible version of psychologism 
holds that mathematical objects correspond to actual thought 
processes, which can vary from individual to individual or 
for one individual over time. This version of psychologism 
immediately raises the problem of relativism. It seems to imply, 
for example, that “there would be  different numbers two for 
each person” (Frege, 1884, p.  37; Pelletier et  al., 2008, p.  25). 
Husserl (2012, p.  78), in his critique of psychologism, devotes 
little attention to this form of the view, describing it as a 
kind of “subjectivism” that is so problematic “it is doubtful 
whether anyone seriously holds it.”
A more plausible form of psychologism takes mathematics 
to be  about the thought processes of an “ideal cognizer” 
(Pelletier et  al., 2008) and the ideal cognizer’s possible mental 
activities. This could be called a “possibilist” form of psychologism 
as contrasted with an actualist form of psychologism 
(Balaguer, 2009). Possibilist psychologism preserves the idea 
that mathematics is about something – namely, the abstract 
thought processes of an idealized agent – while avoiding the 
problem of relativism by claiming that mathematics is about 
a realm of possible thoughts which exist independently of any 
particular person, place, or time. However, the view seems to 
reduce to Platonism: the possible thoughts of an ideal cognizer 
are non-spatio-temporal abstract entities. Hence, the view must 
contend with the objections to Platonism noted above.
Another option is to pursue a form of psychologism according 
to which logic and mathematics do not correspond to possible 
states of minds but rather to something more general, e.g., a 
particular type of cognitive architecture. On this type of view, 
the truths of mathematics are based on the proper functioning 
of a human “logic and mathematics module” (Pelletier et  al., 
2008, p.  50), or (in light of problems with the concept of an 
isolated cognitive module) some more generic type of mental 
processing, i.e., a non-modular cognitive architecture (Spivey, 
2007). Another approach along these lines is to draw on 
Chomsky’s distinction between the competence of an idealized 
reasoner (as contrasted with her actual performances), and 
then to treat mathematical competence as “the result of the 
socio-culturally structured acquisition of mathematical cognitive 
practices that capitalize on the bodily manipulation of symbolic 
and diagrammatic structures” (Fabry and Pantsar, 2019, p.  3).
However, it is not clear whether these refinements of 
psychologism are sufficient to avoid the problems that defeated 
it in the early 20th century. A view which focuses on cognitive 
architecture still locates mathematics in specific mental structures. 
Even if all humans share this architecture, we  can imagine 
other intelligent creatures with different mental architectures 
that might support different mathematics. As Husserl noted, 
views like this imply that “the same proposition … can be true 
for a subject of the species homo, but may be  false for another 
subject of a differently constituted species” (Husserl, 2012, 
section 36). This is counter-intuitive: The statement “2 + 2 = 4” 
seems to be  true everywhere and at all times, regardless of a 
creature’s constitution.
Psychologism faces other problems as well. For example, it 
“seems incapable of accounting for any talk about the class 
of all real numbers, since human beings could never construct 
them all” and “seems to entail that assertions about very large 
numbers (in particular, numbers that no one has ever thought 
about) are all untrue” (Balaguer, 2009, p.  82). These may or 
may not be  serious problems but they are standard in the 
literature and, thus, any form of mind-based mathematics must 
address them. One issue with Lakoff and Nuñez’s Where 
mathematics comes from then, is that long-standing arguments 
such as these are not dealt with, even though their position 
is most closely aligned with psychologism.
Reviving Psychologism?
Lakoff and Nuñez seem to be in a bind. They want to emphasize 
a form of mind-based mathematics, according to which 
mathematics arises directly from its embodiment in metaphors, 
image schemas, and related structures in the human conceptual 
system, with mathematical objects having no existence 
independent of human cognizers. But they also want to avoid 
the kinds of relativistic consequences associated with social 
constructivist views. However, they do not show how these 
conflicting goals can both be  satisfied. In particular, it is not 
clear how they can avoid relativism if they locate mathematics 
in the embodiment of minds like ours, since mind-based 
mathematics seems to lead to “species-specific relativism” or 
“species relativism” (Husserl, 2012; Kusch, 2020), according to 
which the claims of mathematics are only true for creatures 
embodied like we  are.
However, Lakoff and Núñez’s work does suggest a way of 
improving on more traditional psychologist positions. They 
argue that mathematics works so well at describing the physical 
world because mathematicians have repeatedly sought to “fit” 
mathematics to the real world: “human physicists are successful 
in fitting human mathematics as they conceptualize it to their 
human conceptualization of the regularities they observe in 
the physical world” (p.  345–346). This can be  thought of as 
a process of cultural evolution that narrows the gap between 
mind-dependent mathematics and mind-independent physical 
regularities. This approach avoids the relativistic worries that 
plague psychologism by anchoring mathematical cognition in 
objective features of the world. Different beings with different 
bodies should evolve similar mathematics, given that they use 
mathematics to describe features of the same physical world. 
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The position is thus a form of realism that encompasses not 
just embodied cognitive processes but also the “regularities in 
the universe independent of us” (p.  355) that those thought 
processes are adapted to.
This view is in seeming tension with Lakoff and Núñez’s 
stated aversion to the idea that “the mathematics of physics 
resides in physical phenomena” (p.  340), though it may 
be  acceptable to them insofar as mathematics is located not 
in the physical phenomena themselves but in embodied 
cognitive architectures which evolved to represent those 
objective regularities in the physical world. This view still 
faces further challenges (e.g., problems about very large 
numbers), but it does shows that, even if Lakoff and Núñez 
are wrong to claim that their view contradicts existing accounts 
of the ontology of mathematics, they may still have the 
resources to produce a viable new mind-based approach to 
mathematical ontology, an embodied form of psychologism. 
The results of embodied mathematics do not conclusively 
support this account (in light of the argument of “The 
Metaphysical Neutrality of Embodied Mathematics Research” 
section), but, nonetheless, its close alignment with the 
epistemology of mathematical knowledge may provide some 
reason to prefer it over alternative accounts.
EMBODIED MATHEMATICS AND THE 
EPISTEMOLOGY OF ABSTRACT 
KNOWLEDGE
In this section, we  turn from metaphysics to epistemology, 
where embodied mathematics is more directly relevant to 
the philosophical issues (e.g., Pantsar, 2015). The question 
of how we  come to have knowledge of mathematical truths 
is intimately tied to the question of how we  in fact develop 
and use abstract knowledge, and some have explicitly argued 
for a “cognitively informed epistemology of mathematics” 
(Pantsar, 2018, p.  292). The question of the degree to which 
mathematical thinking requires metaphor has been 
independently raised in cognitive linguistics and conceptual 
metaphor theory. In this section, we  critically revisit these 
questions, urging caution in the philosophical interpretation 
of existing empirical evidence.
Are Metaphorical Target Domains 
Constituted by Source Domains?
The idea that mathematical knowledge cannot exist on its 
own is fundamental to Lakoff and Nuñez’s version of an 
embodied philosophy of mathematics. All mathematical 
knowledge is linked to source domains either directly via 
grounding metaphors or indirectly via linking and grounding 
metaphors. Thus, according to them, we  could not have sets 
or differential equations without the relevant source domains. 
On this view, metaphors are constitutive of mathematical 
concepts. This taps into an issue that has been widely discussed 
within the literature on cognitive linguistics, which is whether 
target domains are constituted by source domain information. 
In this section, we  draw a distinction between the view that 
metaphors are constitutive of their target domains (i.e., thinking 
about the abstract target domain cannot exist without 
metaphor) and the view that metaphors are conducive for 
target domain thinking (i.e., metaphors change or help aspects 
of the way target domains are conceptualized, but the target 
domain is cognitively realized at least partially without 
metaphorical mappings). Often, characterizations of metaphor 
theory use language that is not precise enough to establish 
whether a constitutive or conducive view of metaphor is 
held. For example, Gibbs and Berg (1999, p.  618) note that 
“Several kinds of evidence from psycholinguistics supports 
the idea that embodied metaphors underlie people’s 
understanding of abstract concepts.” While there is indeed 
evidence for the idea that metaphor facilitate people’s 
understanding of abstract concepts (as reviewed in “Empirical 
Evidence for Embodied Mathematic” section), it is not clear 
that metaphors “exhaust” abstract concepts. The notion that 
metaphors “underlie” concepts could mean that they provide 
helpful means of accessing those concepts, or it could mean 
that those concepts require the metaphor in order to exist 
in the first place. This is an important distinction that is 
masked by saying that metaphors “underlie” or “ground” 
abstract concepts.
Several authors have questioned the idea that metaphors 
are, in fact, constitutive of target domain knowledge. Barsalou 
(1999, p.  600) discussed the metaphor Anger Is Heated 
Fluid In A Container (evidenced by such English expressions 
as “he blew his stacks” and “I am  boiling with anger”), about 
which he  said:
Knowing only that anger is like liquid exploding from 
a container hardly constitutes an adequate concept. If 
this is all that people know, they are far from having an 
adequate understanding of anger.
On top of that, Barsalou (1999) noted that the idea of a 
“mapping,” inherent to conceptual metaphor theory, appears 
to logically necessitate the existence of two domains. Specifically, 
he noted that “a concrete domain cannot be mapped systematically 
into an abstract domain that has no content” (p.  600).
There is clearly evidence showing that thinking about abstract 
domains automatically engages concrete source domain 
knowledge in a way that is predicted by conceptual metaphor 
theory (Gibbs, 1994; Boroditsky and Ramscar, 2002; Gibbs 
et  al., 2004; Casasanto and Boroditsky, 2008). However, the 
fact that metaphors become activated in particular thought 
processes do not say that metaphors are necessary for such 
thought (see also Murphy, 1996, 1997).
In a similar fashion to Barsalou (1999), Haser (2005, p. 157) 
discusses the metaphor Argument Is War. She points out 
that the idea, central to an embodied view of metaphor, that 
metaphors are acquired through environmental correlations, 
such as noticing similarities between arguments and fights, 
“presupposes an antecedent conception of what arguments are 
otherwise the purported ability to experience ‘correlations’ 
between the two domains appears wholly mysterious.” 
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In a response to this concern, Kertész and Rákosi (2009) note 
that most of the writing in Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) original 
work actually argues for partiality of mapping, i.e., a metaphor 
may concretize or embellish a particular target domain but 
does not fully exhaust the target domain. It seems that this 
partiality was largely given up for Where mathematics comes 
from, as well as for the related philosophical work presented 
in Philosophy in the flesh (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). Thus, 
similar to Haser (2005), Kertész and Rákosi (2009) suggest 
that target domain knowledge does exist independently of 
metaphor, but it is incomplete with metaphor filling in gaps 
by mapping structures from a richer source domain. This is 
precisely what we  mean when we  say that metaphors are 
conducive rather than constitutive of target domain thinking.
It is also important to stress that the theoretical move by 
Lakoff and Nuñez to disallow the target domain a cognitive 
status on its own is at odds with how metaphor is usually 
treated in empirical research. Take for example, Thibodeau 
and Boroditsky’s (2011) seminal experiment which showed that 
describing crime with the metaphorical frame of a Beast leads 
participants to make different policy recommendations than 
if crime is described as a Virus. The idea that two different 
source domains highlight some elements of the target domain 
at the expense of others (“framing”) is based on the premise 
that people have some knowledge about the target domain to 
begin with. Similarly, we  would not want to say that because 
there are metaphors such as Love Is A Journey, people have 
no other way of conceptualizing love without metaphor. Yet, 
this is precisely the reasoning step that Lakoff and Núñez 
undertake in Where mathematics comes from when they argue 
that mathematical objects have no existence without metaphor.
Future research would need to show to what extent thinking 
about abstract concepts is in fact, constituted by metaphor. 
The available empirical evidence clearly shows that metaphor 
changes reasoning and may also aid acquisition (Casasanto 
and de Bruin, 2019), but none of this directly supports the 
conclusion that reasoning and concept acquisition could not 
happen without these metaphors, even if reasoning without 
metaphor would be  impoverished. More problematically for 
embodied mathematics is the fact that the available empirical 
evidence has failed to find a concrete link between mathematical 
achievement and thinking about numbers spatially 
(Cipora and Nuerk, 2013; Cipora et  al., 2015, 2016, 2018). In 
fact, some studies have even found that stronger spatial-numerical 
associations are associated with worse mathematical ability 
(Kramer et  al., 2018). At least on the surface, this evidence 
is at odds with the idea that the mental number line (which 
is part of Lakoff and Nuñez’s 4Gs) plays a formative role in 
mathematical thought. Alternatively, the results by Kramer et al. 
(2018) could be  interpreted as being consistent with a role of 
the number line in scaffolding mathematical concepts, which 
is left behind later, for example, at the expense of more abstract 
symbolic representations.
It is also important to point out that for many researchers 
in the general cognitive science literature, metaphor is not 
considered to be  the primary cognitive support of abstract 
representations. How people come to have abstract concepts is 
one of the key challenges of cognitive science (Kousta et  al., 
2011; Vigliocco et  al., 2013; Borghi et  al., 2017; Bolognesi and 
Steen, 2018; Lupyan and Winter, 2018). Most researchers in this 
field acknowledge that there are multiple aspects of our cognition 
that support abstract concepts, and a large number of people 
think that a lot of abstract knowledge is represented in a linguistic 
format (Lupyan and Winter, 2018). This is not to say that 
metaphor is not important for abstract thought, but the empirical 
literature clearly shows that it is not the only factor to consider.
To clarify: we  do not mean to say that metaphors are not 
important for abstract thought – the available empirical evidence 
(see “Empirical Evidence for Embodied Mathematic”) clearly 
suggests that they are. We thus do not question the idea that 
metaphors are functionally relevant for some aspects of our 
mental lives, such as making it easier to think about particular 
topics or facilitating the acquisition of particular concepts; 
however, such a view is a far shot from saying that concepts 
cannot be  thought without metaphor, which is indeed a claim 
that is hard to address with empirical evidence. Lakoff and 
Núñez’s argumentative move to disallow mathematics any 
existence of its own rests on the idea that certain aspects of 
abstract thought cannot exist without metaphors, and it is 
precisely this aspect of conceptual metaphor theory that has 
little empirical support at this stage.
Finally, it should be  emphasized again that while there is 
abundant evidence for embodied effects in mathematical thinking, 
much of the existing literature is focused on relatively low-level 
number concepts and at most, simple arithmetical computation 
(McCrink et  al., 2007; Knops et  al., 2009; Marghetis et  al., 
2014). Some insightful work has investigated more abstract 
concepts, such as limits and infinity, using gesture analysis 
(Marghetis and Núñez, 2013), and there also is evidence for 
embodied representations of more abstract concepts coming 
from the analysis of classroom discourse (Staats and Batteen, 
2009). However, these strands of evidence for the embodiment 
of more abstract mathematical processes are observational, with 
more experimental work needed that goes beyond low-level 
mathematics to do justice to Lakoff and Núñez’s key contribution. 
To make this possible, more experimental research needs to 
study the cognition of professional mathematicians, as has been 
done in only very few studies so far (Cipora et  al., 2016).
Lack of Empirical Evidence for More 
Complex Aspects of Metaphor Theory
In response to Rakova’s (2002) critique of their philosophical 
work, Johnson and Lakoff (2002) point out that their position 
rests on a firm body of empirical evidence supporting the 
idea that the mind is embodied. This argument extends to 
Lakoff and Núñez’s Where mathematics comes from. However, 
just because some aspects of metaphor theory have been 
empirically confirmed, we should not think that all of metaphor 
theory is backed up by empirical evidence.
For example, Haser (2005) discusses the idea that complex 
metaphors, such as Theories Are Buildings, are built from 
primary metaphors (Grady, 1997), a key component of conceptual 
metaphor theory that has conceptual parallels in Lakoff and 
Núñez’s work how grounding metaphors (such as the 4G’s) allow 
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building up a larger cognitive edifice of mathematical thought 
through the extension of linking metaphors. Although theoretically 
appealing, none of these ideas have been tested directly, as 
discussed by Haser (2005). Similarly, the idea that our understanding 
of infinity rests on some form of metaphorical mapping is 
theoretically appealing and has fruitfully been applied within 
philosophy of mathematics (Pantsar, 2015). However, there are, 
at present, no direct empirical investigations of this topic that 
we  are aware of. This is not a fault of Lakoff and Núñez’s work 
and its extensions, which is intended to be  theoretical. It is 
equally an issue with the experimental research, which tends to 
focus on those issues that allow formulating simple experiments, 
which is often easier to do for simple numerical representations 
and low-level arithmetic. Devising experiments that test the idea 
that our understanding of infinity rests on aspectual thinking, 
or that our understanding of sets rests on containers, is a much 
harder task. From this perspective, Lakoff and Núñez’s book 
can be seen as a call for experimental researchers to tackle more 
abstract aspects of mathematical thinking. The book is rife with 
hypotheses and conjectures to be tested experimentally that would 
help move the field of embodied mathematical cognition research 
away from exclusively focusing on basic number concepts.
The arguments developed above put pressure on the claim 
that metaphor is constitutive for abstract thinking, including 
mathematical thinking, which is another aspect of metaphor 
theory that is in further need of empirical investigation. However, 
conversely, our discussion leaves open the possibility that there 
are metaphors that are not only conducive of abstract thought 
but also constitutive of it. Further empirical work testing these 
questions, in coordination with philosophical work in the relevant 
areas of epistemology, is needed to make progress on these issues.
CONCLUSION
Embodied approaches to numerical and mathematical thought 
have produced an impressive array of results, which promise 
to yield new insights into the nature of mathematical knowledge 
and even mathematics itself. However, in both cases, we  urge 
caution. The empirical results are strictly speaking neutral 
with respect to the ontological status of mathematical objects, 
and the available empirical evidence may only show that 
metaphor is conductive to abstract thought, rather than 
constitutive of it. In addition, we have warned against treating 
conceptual metaphor theory as a whole as empirically confirmed 
when only some parts of it rest on empirical evidence. However, 
all of this points to exciting new directions for research in 
the cognitive science and philosophy of mathematics. Existing 
work on the embodied representation of number could 
be extended to more abstract domains of mathematics. Studies 
could be  designed to test the difference between the 
“constitutive” and “conducive” views of metaphor. The revival 
of psychologism outlined above could be  further developed 
in order to see how it fares with respect to the full battery 
of counter-arguments that might be  made against it. In these 
and other ways, our hope is to motivate a closer integration 
between accounts of how mathematical thinking actually 
unfolds, what mathematical objects are, how we  come to 
have knowledge of them, and how to experimentally probe 
this knowledge.
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